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ABSTRACT
Two-person median game theory has application advantages over
expected-value game theory. For example, median game theory is usable
when the values in one or both payoff matrices do not satisfy the
arithmetical operations (but can be ranked within each matrix). Also,
the class of games where the players have optimum solutions is huge
compared to (and includes) this class for expected-value game theory.
Moreover, there is a much larger class where one player, but not
necessarily the other, has an optimum solution (no expected-value
analogue occurs). The overwhelmingly large class of median games,
however, is that where at least one player does not have an optimum
solution. That is, for one or both players, no strategy exists (pure
or mixed) such that the player can simultaneously be as protective as
possible for himself and as vindictive as possible toward the other
player. To reasonably resolve such situations a "relative desirability"
function, suitably chosen, is used to order pairs of payoffs, a payoff
to each player, that occur for some of the combinations of pure strategies
(according to increasing desirability to the player considered). This
provides the basis for a compromise "optimum" solution and identification
of a corresponding "optimum" strategy.
* Research partially supported by Mobil Research and Development Corporation.
Also associated with ONR Contract N00014-6e-A-0515 and NASA Grant NGR
44-007-028.
INTRODUCTION AND DISCUSSION
The case of two players with finite numbers of strategies is con-
sidered. Each player selects his strategy separately and independently
of the strategy choice by the other player. Median game theory and its
application advantages over expected-value game theory are discussed in
ref. 1 (also see ref. 2).
The class of median competitive games, and of one player median
competitive (OPMC) games, are identified in ref. 1. These identifications
are stated in terms of the pairs of payoffs that correspond to the strategy
combinations for the players (called I and II). A game is OPMC for player
I (II) if and only if he can assure, with probability at least 1/2,
that a pair in set I (set II) occurs. Set I (set II) consists of the
pairs such that both the payoff to player I (II) is at least PI (PII)
and the payoff to player II (I) is at most P I I (P I ). Here PI (PII ) is
determined as the largest value that player I (II), acting as protectively
as possible, can assure himself with probability at least 1/2. Also, a
smallest value PI (PIP occurs in the payoff matrix for player I (II) such
that vindictive player II (I) can assure, with probability at least 1/2,
that player I (II) receives at most this amount. A way of evaluating
PI, PII , PI, P II, and of deciding whether a game is OPMC for a player,
is given in ref. 1. A game is median competitive if and only if it is
OPMC for both players.
When a game is OPMC for a player, the median optimum solution given
in ref. 1 would seem satisfactory for that player. However, the over-
whelmingly large class of games is that where an OPMC situation does
not occur for at least one player.
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A generalization of the OPMC concept is needed to obtain "optimum"
solutions for players in games that are not OPMC for them. A method is
given for supplementing the pairs of set I (set II) for player I (II)
until (the first time) some pair of this set can be assured with prob-
ability at least 1/2. Specifically, a suitable "relative desirability"
function is chosen for selecting the pairs for the set (according to
increasing desirability to the player considered).
This function is such that all pairs of set I (set II) have the
maximum desirability for player I (II). Let (p I
,
 pII) denote a general
pair. For player I, relative desirability is a nonincreasing function
of P I - p I
 for fixed pII - PII' and a nonincreasing function of pII - PII
for fixed P I - p 2
	Likewise, for player II, relative desirability is
a nonincreasing function of PII - pII for fixed p  - PT, and a nonincreasing
function of p I - PI for fixed P
II - pII .
Subject to these weak restrictions, which are intuitively justified,
i
the relative desirability function for a player can be of any form. Of
course, the relative desirability function for one player need not be
even roughly the same as that for the other player. Also, neither player
needs to know anything further about the relative desirability function
for the other player. In fact a player does not need an explicit function
as long as his ordering of pairs satisfies the restrictions.
A compromise median optimum solution is obtained through ordering
of the pairs, separately for each player, according to increasing desir-
ability. Also, a corresponding median optimum strategy is developed.
These results and statements about their derivation are given in the
next, and final, section.
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RESULTS
Since the game is not OPMC for the player considered, say player I,
a pair of set I cannot be assured with probability at least 1/2. However,
pairs not in set I can be ordered according to their desirability to
player I.
Consider the payoff matrix for player I. The rows of this matrix
correspond to the strategies for player I while the columns are the
strategies for the other player. First mark the payoffs in this matrix
that occur for the pairs of set I. Then, according to decreasing desir-
ability, mark the payoffs for the other pairs, where all pairs of equal
desirability are marked at the same time. Continue until the first
time that marks in all columns can be obtained from two or fewer of the
rows. Now, remove the marks for the least desirable pair(s) of those
that received marks. Then, by the following method, determine whether
some one of the remaining marked pairs can be assured with probability
at least 1/2. The method is to replace every marked value in the matrix
by unity and all others by zero. The resulting matrix of ones and zeroes
is considered to be for a zero-sum game with an expected-value basis and
is solved for the value of the game to player I. Some one of the remaining
marked pairs can be obtained with probability at least 1/2 if and only
if this game value is at least 1/2.
Suppose that player I cannot assure a remaining marked pair with
probability at least 1/2. Then the maximum level of desirability that
can be assured with probability at least 1/2 is the level corresponding
to a pair that just had its markings removed. Otherwise, remove the
4
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marks for the least desirable pair(s) of those still having marks. Then,
as just discussed, determine whether some one of the remaining marked 	 i
pairs can be assured with probability at least 1/2. If not, the maximum
level of desirability that can be assured with probability at least 1/2	 s
is the level corresponding to a pair that just had its markings removed
(at this step). If a probability of at least 1/2 can be assured, continue
in the same way until some one of the remaining marked pairs cannot be
assured with probability at least 1/2. Then, the maximum desirability
level that can be assured with probability at least 1/2 is tie level for
a pair that just had its markings removed (at this last step).
Use of "level of desirability," rather than statement of a lower
bound for p  and an upper bound for pII, seems appropriate, even though
	
_a
these bounds have determined values. The reason is that knowledge of
the lower value of p  and the lower value of p II for a set of pairs does
not necessarily establish the minimum level of desirability for the pairs
of this set.
Now consider determination of a median optimum strategy for player
I. Use the matrix marking that (ultimately) resulted in the smallest set
of marked pairs such that a pair of this set can be assured with probability
at least 1/2. Replace the marked values by unity and the others by zero,
in the matrix for player I. Treat the resulting matrix as that for a
zero-sum game with an expected-value basis. An optimum strategy- for
player I in this zero-sum game is a median optimum strategy for that player.
The verification for these results is of the same nature as for the
results of ref. 1. Suitably ir:terpreted, Theorems 1 and 2 of ref. 1
provide this verification. For brevity, no specific justification is given.
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o-person median game theory has application advantages over expected-value
game theory.	 For example, median game theory is usable when the values in one or
both payoff matrices do not satiufy the arithmetical operations (but can be ranked
within each matrix). 	 Also, the class of games where the players have optimum solu-
tions is huge compared to (and includes) this class for expected-value game theory.
Moreover, there is a much larger class where one player, but not necessarily the
other, has an optimum solution (no exp-.:cted-value analogue occurs).	 The over-
whelmingly large class of median games, however, is that where at least one player
does not have an optimum solution.	 That is, for one or both players, no strategy
exists (pure or mixed) such that the player can simultaneoudly be as protective as
possible for himself and as vindictive as possible toward the other player. 	 To
reasonably resolve such situations a "relative desirability" function, suitably
chosen, is used to order pairs of payoffs, a payoff to each player, that occur for
some of the combinations of pure strategies (according to increasing desirability
to the player considered).	 This provides the basis for a compromise "optimum"
solution and identification of a corresponding "optimum" strategy.
OVA. w	 an...
R r.'
M'y
z<:
r
"I .
LJRJ I NOV 66 4 I3	 UNCLASSIFIED
SecuntY CIIISai ication
